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Flight Safety Information - October 30, 2026 No. 214

In This Issue

: Built for FBOs. Powered by real-time data. Focused on what matters.

: How a 1952 Plane Crash Changed Airline Safety

: Save The Date - February 11-12, 2027 - ProDIGIQ User Conference

: Powerplant Failures Leading Cause of Fatal Business Aviation Accidents

: Emergency response agencies teaming up for aircraft crash simulation exercise at Temple TX airport

: Italian CH-47 crashes during EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: What we know

: Colombian Air Force C-130H Hercules crashes in Puerto Leguízamo during takeoff phase: What We Know

: Germany confirms the Vietnam Airlines 787 that overran Munich's runway applied brakes during takeoff

: Sydney air traffic controller had high fatigue risk when Virgin jet cut in front of Qantas, report says

: A rare airline incident exposed a safety system most passengers never see

: Operational safety and unmanned aircraft: Hazards related to air traffic control activity

: Calendar of Events

How a 1952 Plane Crash Changed Airline Safety

The tragedy of Pan Am Flight 526A helped pave the way for safety briefings and other measures passengers know today.

Jordan Friedman

Pan American Airways clipper sits on the runway at the airport circa 1947 in San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Photo by Earl Leaf/Michael Ochs Archives/Getty Images

Published: September 24, 2026

Last Updated: September 24, 2026

On a sunny afternoon in April 1952, Pan Am Flight 526A took off from San Juan’s Isla Grande Airport. Minutes later, it began an unexpected descent over the Atlantic Ocean.

The New York-bound plane, named Clipper Endeavor, was carrying 69 people when one of its four engines failed and another lost power, forcing the crew to make an emergency landing at sea. Everyone on board initially survived the crash, but the tail section of the Douglas DC-4 aircraft broke off and water rushed into the cabin. At a time before today’s mandatory safety briefings, many confused and panicked passengers remained aboard despite orders to evacuate. After less than three minutes, Clipper Endeavor sank, resulting in 52 fatalities. The disaster, which occurred on Good Friday, became known as the “Good Friday Tragedy.”

“Everybody was crying, crying, crying when the plane was floating—but then the plane sank completely and there was silence,” recalls crash survivor Victorina Riera, now 102 years old. Then a registered nurse in her 20s, Riera was flying home to New York after visiting family in Puerto Rico.

The wreckage sank to the ocean floor and wasn’t located for more than 70 years. According to aviation analyst and retired pilot John Cox, the tragedy became a “watershed event” that helped usher in new airline safety protocols, from preflight demonstrations to more detailed seatback emergency cards.

Lost WWII Plane Mystery in the South Pacific

Explore rare WWII footage as Fred Linden shares his father’s films as a PBY naval aviator in the South Pacific.

Clipper Endeavor’s Emergency Water Landing

In the years leading up to the crash, many of the aviation innovations that helped the Allies win World War II—from enhanced aircraft design to more sophisticated navigational aids—were transforming commercial aviation. The United States saw a surge in flying, primarily among wealthy people and business travelers. Many planes constructed for military purposes, including the Clipper Endeavor, were repurposed for civilian use.

Despite numerous deadly accidents in the late 1940s and early ’50s, the industry hadn’t yet developed a comprehensive system for educating passengers on air safety, according to Russ Matthews, president of the nonprofit Air/Sea Heritage Foundation. That began to change after April 11, 1952, when the propeller-driven Clipper Endeavor, with 20,835 logged flight hours, departed for New York at 12:11 p.m., carrying 64 passengers and five crew members.

Disaster struck on the plane’s initial climb when one engine, then another, malfunctioned off Puerto Rico’s northern coast. “It seemed to be going very slow and did not gain altitude quickly,” passenger Gloria Rosario later recalled in a survivor statement. She said it “began to weave from side to side.”

According to an accident report published in September 1952 by the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, the captain originally planned to return to San Juan but soon realized that a water landing was his only option.

Luggage is loaded on a Pan American Airways clipper circa 1947 in San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Photo by Earl Leaf/Michael Ochs Archives/Getty Images

Panic Hampered the Evacuation

Everyone on board, including six infants, initially survived the ditching at approximately 12:20 p.m. “The plane hit the water very hard and I was thrown forward roughly,” Rosario said. “Immediately the water began pouring into the plane.”

Only then did crew members begin distributing life jackets, which were stored in pouches attached to the backs of the seats. Passengers hadn’t been briefed on how to use the vests before takeoff. Of the four life rafts stored in a rack behind the cockpit, only one was successfully launched.

In the commotion, most passengers on board were too stunned to move, despite Clipper Endeavor’s tail floating in the Atlantic and the captain ordering the cabin to abandon ship, the accident report said. A language barrier between the crew and some Spanish-speaking passengers further hampered communication.

Riera managed to open the rear cabin door before jumping into the water and swimming to a life raft. Along with the five crew members, only 12 passengers survived. The investigation into the crash found that the captain and seven passengers floated in shark-infested waters for the next 30 to 60 minutes before they were picked up by rescue aircraft. Of the 52 people who died, 39 bodies were never recovered.

How the Crash Reshaped Aviation Safety

In a report released in September 1952, the Civil Aeronautics Board concluded that mechanical issues were partly to blame and that the plane “was not airworthy when it departed San Juan.” It had undergone repairs the previous day after mechanics discovered abnormal fuel levels and metal flakes in one of the engines.

But the report also attributed the dozens of fatalities to the confusion that immediately followed the ditching. More lives might have been saved if the crew had prepared passengers for an emergency water landing and had life rafts been more readily available.

As a result “of this and similar accidents,” the board proposed new airline safety standards that helped lay the groundwork for reform. “It was not immediate, but it was a series of steady steps taken by the industry to improve passenger briefings,” says Cox, the founder and CEO of Safety Operating Systems.

Pan American inflight seatbelt and emergency instructions brochure, 1970s.

Alamy Stock Photo

Those efforts culminated in 1965, when the Federal Aviation Administration mandated preflight passenger briefings to cover when and where smoking is allowed on an aircraft, how to use seatbelts and where emergency exits are located. Those guidelines have since evolved to include guidance on using oxygen masks and water evacuation procedures.

With more people flying during the jet age, regulators also began to require that life rafts be easily accessible to passengers and that printed emergency cards be placed in convenient locations. “[The cards] used better illustrations. They showed clearly how to operate an exit,” Cox says. “Those sorts of things were an outgrowth out of this accident.”

The outcome was very different more than a half-century later, when US Airways Flight 1549 famously landed on New York’s Hudson River in January 2009, an emergency landing known as the "Miracle on the Hudson." Although the National Transportation Safety Board later found that roughly 70 percent of passengers hadn’t watched the preflight safety briefing, there were no fatalities thanks in part to the crew’s handling of the emergency, the rapid evacuation and the fast arrival of nearby rescue boats.

"You can draw a straight line from Clipper Endeavor to ‘Miracle on the Hudson,’" Matthews says, noting that the 1952 tragedy drove “sweeping changes across the board that make us safer to this day.”

Safety instructions shown by a flight attendant on a RyanAir flight.

Photo by EyesWideOpen/Getty Images

Plane Wreckage Found 74 Years Later

Resting roughly 2,000 feet beneath the ocean’s surface, the exact whereabouts of Clipper Endeavor remained unknown for more than seven decades. It was finally located in June 2026 after a years-long investigation led by the Air/Sea Heritage Foundation in partnership with Deep Sea Vision (DSV) and Discovery Channel’s Expedition Unknown series.

A research vessel equipped with an advanced autonomous underwater vehicle searched the ocean floor. According to The New York Times, the wreckage wasn’t disturbed.

How a 1952 Plane Crash Changed Airline Safety

Powerplant Failures Leading Cause of Fatal Business Aviation Accidents

By General Aviation News Staff

September 3, 2026

NBAA tracked Accidents and Incidents, April-June 2026. (Graph Courtesy NBAA)

A recent analysis of business aviation accidents by the National Business Aviation Association finds that powerplant system and component failures were the leading cause of fatal accidents.

The association’s analysis, which covers the second quarter of 2026, from April through June, examined 66 events, including 42 incidents and 24 accidents. Six accidents were fatal, resulting in 22 fatalities. The fatal accidents involved two business jets, three business turboprops, and one turbine helicopter.

Collisions during takeoff or landing were the most frequent accident type overall, with one fatal occurrence and four non-fatal. Runway excursions and powerplant system or component failures followed, with three accidents each.

Bird strikes accounted for 12 of the quarter’s 66 events. Non-powerplant system or component failures followed with 11 events, while powerplant system or component failures accounted for nine.

“NBAA’s quarterly analysis gives the business aviation community a clear and timely understanding of where risks are appearing across the operating environment,” said Mark Larsen, NBAA’s director of safety and flight operations. “The Q2 findings reinforce the need for rigorous preflight preparation, disciplined takeoff and landing practices, runway-excursion prevention, and close attention to aircraft system and powerplant reliability.”

The report also emphasizes that events not resulting in an accident can still reveal operational hazards. For example, the high number of bird strikes and aircraft system or component failures underscores the value of wildlife-hazard awareness, proactive maintenance, thorough inspections, and effective procedures for recognizing and responding to abnormal indications, NBAA officials said.

Launched in the fourth quarter of 2025, NBAA’s quarterly Business Aviation Accident and Incident Analysis aims to provide the business aviation community with “a consistent, accessible picture of safety events involving turbine-powered business aircraft,” association officials said.

These analyses, updated as additional information becomes available, are intended to identify trends and areas for further attention, not to assign probable cause, officials added.

The quarterly reports also connect observed trends with NBAA Safety Committee priorities and the association’s expanding portfolio of safety guidance, education, and advocacy, they noted.

For more information: NBAA.org

Powerplant Failures Leading Cause of Fatal Business Aviation Accidents

Emergency response agencies teaming up for aircraft crash simulation exercise at Temple TX airport

BY JASON CHLAPEK | TELEGRAM STAFF WRITER Oct 28, 2026 Updated 17 hrs ago

An airplane is parked under the hangar at the Draughon-Miller Central Texas Regional Airport.

Nine local, regional and state agencies will come together to train on best practices in the event of an aircraft crash in the Temple area.

The exercise will take place for roughly two hours starting at 9 a.m. Wednesday, Nov. 4, at the Draughon-Miller Central Texas Regional Airport, 7720 Airport Road.

According to Nohely Mackowiak, public relations coordinator for the city of Temple, the exercise will simulate an aircraft crash at the airport, which is on the west side of the city.

“Participating agencies will practice emergency response procedures, including establishing a unified command, coordinating emergency personnel, conducting patient triage and treatment, simulating patient transportation and performing decontamination procedures,” Mackowiak said. “Additional activities will take place at local hospitals, where volunteers will serve as simulated patients to test hospital decontamination procedures.”

Mackowiak said volunteers will also simulate 911 calls associated with the emergency, but no actual patients will be transported during the exercise.

The agencies involved in the simulation include Temple Fire & Rescue, Temple Police Department, Temple Emergency Management, Draughon-Miller Central Texas Regional Airport staff, Temple EMS, Baylor Scott & White Medical Center-Temple, Baylor Scott & White McLane Children’s Center, Capital Area of Texas Regional Advisory Council and Texas Department of Public Safety.

“The exercise was requested by the airport to ensure that firefighters and airport staff are prepared to respond effectively in the event of an emergency,” Mackowiak said. “It also provides an opportunity to strengthen communication, coordination and collaboration with outside agencies that may assist during an emergency response at the airport.”

Residents and motorists in the area may notice an increased presence of emergency response vehicles and personnel during the exercise. There is no emergency or threat to the public.

Emergency response agencies teaming up for aircraft crash simulation exercise at Temple TX airport

Italian CH-47 crashes during EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: What we know...

Three people were killed and another 12 injured, according to local media. The Italian Army helicopter went down near Brčko and the cause of the accident is still under investigation.

jueves 29 de octubre de 2026 14:49

Gastón Dubois

Apasionado por la aviación, la historia, la política y la defensa. Editor-in-Chief en Aviacionline Defensa, combinando estos conocimiento para ofrecer un contenido valioso sobre temas estratégicos y de seguridad.

A Chinook from the Italian contingent of EUFOR Althea lies destroyed after crashing in Bosnia.

Resumen autogenerado por IA

A CH-47 Chinook helicopter of the Italian Army crashed in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the European Union's EUFOR Althea operation.The accident occurred near the village of Gorice, close to Brčko; according to local media, three people died and 12 were injured, one of them in critical condition.The Italian Ministry of Defence and EUFOR confirmed the accident and are investigating the causes; no damage was reported to infrastructure, property or civilian vehicles, and no civilians were injured.The helicopter was completely destroyed on impact and witnesses said the aircraft appeared to start spinning in the air before going down.The CH-47 is part of the Italian Army aviation detachment deployed to support EUFOR Althea; the investigation will have to determine whether there was a technical failure, operating conditions or other factors.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

A Boeing CH-47 Chinook heavy transport helicopter of the Italian Army crashed this Thursday, October 29, in Bosnia and Herzegovina while taking part in the European Union's EUFOR Althea operation. The accident occurred near the village of Gorice, close to Brčko, in the northeast of the country. According to local media, three people died and another 12 were injured, one of them in critical condition. The military authorities have not yet officially reported the casualty toll or the cause of the crash.

X post from Ministero Difesa

The Italian Ministry of Defence confirmed that the aircraft came down during the afternoon for reasons that are still under investigation. The statement said emergency teams responded immediately and that no further details could be released until precise information was available, especially regarding the condition of the personnel involved.

EUFOR, for its part, confirmed that one of its aircraft suffered an accident during a routine operation in the Brčko area. The European mission said that no damage was reported to infrastructure, property or civilian vehicles, and that no civilians were injured. It also announced a thorough investigation to establish the circumstances of the incident and asked the public to rely on official channels for information.

Preguntas frecuentes

Where did the accident occur? Near the village of Gorice, in the vicinity of Brčko, in northeastern Bosnia and Herzegovina.What type of aircraft crashed? A Boeing CH-47 Chinook heavy transport helicopter of the Italian Army.What is the casualty toll? According to local media, three people died and another 12 were injured, one of them in critical condition; the military authorities have not officially reported the toll.What mission was the helicopter flying? It was taking part in the European Union's EUFOR Althea operation.Are the causes of the accident known? No; the causes are under investigation and no official details have been released about the aircraft's configuration, its crew, the flight profile or the weather conditions.

X post from GOLDZEN 🇧🇦

According to the Bosnian outlet Klix.ba, the helicopter was completely destroyed on impact. The Brčko District Police, firefighters and emergency services went to the scene, where a security perimeter was established. Witnesses cited by the same outlet said the aircraft appeared to start spinning in the air before going down, an account supported by the video posted by the local OSINT account GOLDZEN.

The Italian contribution to EUFOR Althea

The CH-47 is part of the Italian Army aviation detachment deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina to support EUFOR Althea activities. According to official information published by the mission in July 2026, the detachment has two flight groups operating CH-47 and AB205 helicopters. Its tasks include transport, reconnaissance, support for multinational units and training activities with the Bosnian Armed Forces and police agencies.

The Chinook is a heavy transport helicopter with tandem rotors, designed to carry troops, cargo and equipment, as well as to perform logistics support and evacuation missions. In the Italian fleet, the CH-47F variant incorporates digital flight systems and a modernized architecture that allows integration with the Armed Forces' command and control systems. Italian industry participates in the programme through Leonardo, responsible for systems integration and final assembly of the national ICH-47Fs, in cooperation with Boeing.

Italian Army ICH-47F.

EUFOR Althea is the European Union's military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, established in 2004 to help maintain a safe and secure environment in the country. The availability of air transport assets allows the mission to move personnel and equipment, provide logistics support and operate in areas where ground access may be more complex.

For the moment, no official details have been disclosed about the exact configuration of the crashed aircraft, its crew, the flight profile or the weather conditions at the time of the incident. The investigation will have to determine whether the accident was related to a technical failure, the operating conditions or other factors. Until its findings are known, any explanation for the cause of the crash would be premature.

Italian CH-47 crashes during EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: What we know

Colombian Air Force C-130H Hercules crashes in Puerto Leguízamo during takeoff phase: What We Know

The Lockheed C-130H Hercules, FAC 1016, crashed in Putumayo with a significant number of soldiers on board. The aircraft fell shortly after takeoff from the La Tagua airstrip.

lunes 23 de marzo de 2026 13:28

Pablo Diaz (Diazpez)

Desde 2017, haciendo periodismo aeronáutico. Award-Winning Journalist: Ganador de la edición 2023 de "Periodismo de Altura", otorgado por ALTA. Facts don't care about your feelings.

Resumen autogenerado por IA

C-130H Hercules FAC 1016 se estrelló cerca de Puerto Leguízamo (Putumayo) tras el despegue desde la pista La Tagua mientras transportaba tropas.Al menos 110 militares a bordo, pertenecientes a tres pelotones con destino a Puerto Asís; cifra no verificada de forma independiente.El avión perdió sustentación durante la fase de ascenso inicial e impactó en zona de selva densa a pocos kilómetros del aeródromo.Se iniciaron operaciones de rescate por la Policía Nacional y personal médico local para evacuar sobrevivientes y trasladar heridos a centros de alta complejidad.FAC 1016 llegó a Colombia en septiembre de 2020 vía el programa EDA de EE. UU.; originalmente USAF 83-0488; recibió PDM en CIAC entre 2021–2023 con revisión estructural y actualización de motores.La aeronave es un C-130H con cuatro motores turboprop Allison T56-A-15 (4.591 pshp cada uno) diseñada para operar en pistas cortas y no preparadas, con rampa de carga trasera hidráulica.Condiciones meteorológicas mostraron alta humedad y temperatura (28°C, punto de rocío 24°C) que aumentan la densidad de altitud y reducen rendimiento y sustentación en despegues desde pistas selváticas.La investigación técnica la dirigirá la Inspectoría General de la Fuerza Aérea para determinar si la causa fue fallo en sistemas de combustible o rendimiento de los T56-A-15 bajo condiciones térmicas exigentes.La logística aérea es crucial en Putumayo por la ausencia de infraestructura vial, lo que hace frecuentes los movimientos masivos de tropas por aire.

Colombia

A Lockheed C-130H Hercules heavy transport aircraft, identified by registration FAC 1016, crashed this Monday near Puerto Leguízamo, in the Putumayo department. The aircraft was performing a troop transport mission for the National Army when it went down shortly after taking off from the La Tagua airstrip.

According to El Tiempo, at least 110 service members were on board, belonging to three platoons destined for Puerto Asís. The number of troops reported as transported, elevated for the variant involved in the event, could not be verified by Aviacionline at the time of publishing. Preliminary reports indicate that the aircraft suffered a loss of lift during the initial climb phase, impacting a dense jungle area just a few kilometers from the airfield. National Police rescue units and local medical staff immediately began efforts to evacuate survivors.

The aircraft involved, FAC 1016, is a C-130H that arrived in Colombia in September 2020 as part of the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program from the United States. This unit, which originally operated with the U.S. Air Force (USAF) under serial 83-0488, was a key reinforcement for Colombia's strategic mobility. Between 2021 and 2023, the airframe underwent Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) at the CIAC (Colombian Aeronautical Industry Corporation) facilities, involving a complete structural overhaul and engine updates.

Preguntas frecuentes

¿Qué aeronave se accidentó? Un Lockheed C-130H Hercules, matrícula FAC 1016.¿Dónde ocurrió el accidente? Cerca de Puerto Leguízamo, Putumayo, tras despegar de la pista La Tagua.¿Cuántas personas iban a bordo? Informes preliminares indican al menos 110 militares pertenecientes a tres pelotones, cifra no confirmada de forma independiente.¿Qué condiciones meteorológicas pudieron influir en el accidente? Alta humedad con temperatura de 28°C y punto de rocío 24°C, generando mayor densidad de altitud que reduce la sustentación y el rendimiento de los motores durante el despegue.¿Quién dirigirá la investigación técnica? La investigación técnica será liderada por la Inspectoría General de la Fuerza Aérea Colombiana.

This model is powered by four Allison T56-A-15 turboprop engines, each generating 4,591 shaft horsepower (pshp). These engines drive four-bladed propellers that allow the Hercules to operate from short, unprepared strips—a critical feature for the airport infrastructure in southern Colombia. The rear loading system, via its hydraulic ramp, facilitates the deployment of vehicles and supplies, establishing the FAC 1016 as a vital tool in the CATAM (Military Transport Air Command) logistical hub.

Meteorological factors: High humidity and density altitude

Regarding the meteorological conditions at the time of the incident, the METAR (Routine Meteorological Aerodrome Report) for Puerto Asís (SKAS)—the closest station to the operational area—at 09:00 local time reported variable winds of just 2 knots and optimal horizontal visibility exceeding 10 kilometers. However, the technical report highlighted a temperature of 28°C with a dew point of 24°C, confirming an extremely high relative humidity in the surface layer. This combination of heat and humidity, along with scattered clouds (SCT) at only 1,300 feet, creates a less dense atmosphere that directly penalizes lift and the performance of the turboprop engines during the critical takeoff phase from jungle airstrips.

The geography of Putumayo presents complex meteorological conditions that directly affect the density altitude, a calculation used by pilots to determine how the aircraft will perform. Military flight programming in this region is constant, as air transport is the only viable alternative for massive troop movements in areas where road infrastructure is non-existent.

The technical investigation, to be led by the Air Force Inspector General, will determine if the failure originated in the fuel systems or in the performance of the T56-A-15 engines under these demanding thermal conditions. For now, the absolute priority of the Military Forces is the recovery of personnel at the impact site and the transfer of the injured to high-complexity medical centers.

Colombian Air Force C-130H Hercules crashes in Puerto Leguízamo during takeoff phase: What We Know

Germany confirms the Vietnam Airlines 787 that overran Munich's runway applied brakes during takeoff

Note: See important technical data in the original article.

The report reconstructs flight VN34 of August 15, 2026: a speed plateau near V1, rotation 12 knots below VR, a tailstrike, 20 destroyed lights and electric brake commands of up to 27 % on the left gear. There were no injuries.

lunes 28 de septiembre de 2026 18:27

Germany’s Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) has released the interim report on the accident involving the Vietnam Airlines Boeing 787-9, flight VN34 Munich–Hanoi, which occurred on August 15, 2026.The aircraft rolled the full length of runway 26L, lifted off from the grass beyond the opposite threshold, struck the approach light and returned to Munich with damage to the fuselage and the landing gear.There were 271 passengers and 16 crew members on board; none of them was injured, but the BFU classified the event as an accident because of structural damage.The report reconstructs a speed plateau near V1 (~168 kt for 18 s), rotation at 163 kt, a tailstrike and electric brake commands of up to 27 % on the left gear.The crew declared PAN-PAN, jettisoned 62 tonnes of fuel and landed on 26R with four damaged tires on the left gear.The investigation remains open and hypotheses range from a pedal input by the pilot flying to an uncommanded system command or a combination of factors.The aircraft was left grounded in Munich and the BFU has not yet published EBA current or clamping force data.

Germany’s Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) has released the interim report on the accident involving the Boeing 787-9 of Vietnam Airlines that, on August 15, 2026, rolled the full length of Munich’s runway 26L, lifted off from the grass beyond the opposite threshold, struck the approach light and returned to the airport with damage to the fuselage and the landing gear.

There were 271 passengers and 16 crew members on board, none of whom was injured. The BFU classified the event as an accident because of the structural damage sustained by the aircraft.

The aircraft, registration VN-A867 (MSN 39287, built in 2016, GE GEnx-1B engines, 41,421 hours and 8,189 cycles), was operating flight VN34 Munich–Hanoi. Vietnam Airlines launched that route in October 2024 with its Dreamliners configured in three classes.

Preguntas frecuentes

What happened to Vietnam Airlines flight VN34 in Munich? The Boeing 787-9 rolled the full length of runway 26L, lifted off from the grass beyond the opposite threshold, struck the approach light and returned to the airport with damage to the fuselage and the landing gear. There were no injuries.What does the BFU preliminary report say?
The BFU reconstructed the takeoff using EAFR data: a speed plateau near V1, rotation 12 knots below VR, a tailstrike and electric brake commands of up to 27 % on the left gear.How many people were on board and were there any injuries?
There were 271 passengers and 16 crew members. None of them was injured, although the BFU classified the event as an accident because of the structural damage.What damage did the aircraft sustain? It sustained substantial damage to the tail section from contact with the pavement and the lights, and four tires on the left main landing gear were damaged.
What did the crew do after the failed takeoff? They declared PAN-PAN, made two low passes over 26R for a visual inspection, jettisoned 62 tonnes of fuel and finally landed on 26R with flaps 30.
Why could the cockpit voice recording of the takeoff not be analysed? The cockpit voice recording was overwritten because the landing took place more than two hours later and each CVR stores only two hours.
What hypotheses is the BFU investigating regarding the brake application?
Three families are being considered: a pedal input from the pilot flying, an uncommanded system command, or a combination of a light pedal with amplifying logic or uneven anti-skid.What is the current status of the investigation?
The investigation remains open. The interim report does not yet analyse takeoff performance versus runway, the consistency between crew perceptions and EAFR data, or the exact role of the brakes.

The report draws on the two Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorders (EAFR) and on the crew’s statements. The cockpit voice recording of the takeoff was overwritten, because the landing took place more than two hours later and each CVR stores only two hours.

Takeoff numbers

The takeoff mass was 240,857 kg (MTOW 247,207 kg), with 68,783 kg of fuel, flaps 5° and sealed takeoff slats. The speeds calculated in the Class 3 EFB and confirmed by the EAFR were V1 169 kt, VR 175 kt and V2 180 kt. The 11:50 UTC METAR indicated visibility above 10 km, variable wind at 3 kt, 33 °C and QNH 1,016 hPa. Runway 26L has a TORA of 4,000 m and a TODA of 4,060 m, with a 60 m clearway at each end.

ParameterValueReferenceRemarkTakeoff mass240,857 kgMTOW 247,207 kgBelow maximumV1 / VR / V2169 / 175 / 180 ktEFB + EAFRIASActual rotation163 kt IAS11:57:14 UTC12 kt below VRIAS plateau~168 kt / 18 sfrom 11:57:03with brief dropsMax. BSCU command27 % left / 17 % right11:57:12 UTCpedal 7.2° out of 12.5°Liftoffgrass beyond 08Rtire marks ~240 m20 destroyed lightsFuel jettisoned62 t12:22–13:07 UTCat FL90Landing26R / 13:56 UTC176.5 t / 143 ktflaps 30

Data taken from interim report BFU26-0757-AX. Times in UTC (CEST = UTC+2).

Takeoff roll timeline

The aircraft left stand 103 at Terminal 1 at 11:35 UTC. At 11:53:57 it was cleared to line up on 26L and at 11:55:47 it received takeoff clearance. TO/GA mode was activated at 11:56:12.

11:56:15 — The EAFR records movement of both left pedals (flying pilot’s seat) and of the rudder. Tire marks from both main landing gears were found next to intersection B4. The brake control units (BSCU) commanded 15 % to the left and 6 % to the right.
11:57:03 to 11:57:12 — IAS holds at around 168 kt for some 18 seconds, with short drops. New brake activity: maximum pedal 7.2° (range 0–12.5°). The left BSCU command (inboard and outboard channels) reaches about 27 %; the right one, 17 %.
11:57:13 — The pilot monitoring increases thrust from 100 % to 101 % N1.

11:57:14 — Rotation at 163 kt IAS abeam the threshold. Pitch at the air-ground transition: 6.88°. Angle of attack: 6.89°. Left column pull: +93 units (range –279 to +279)

The aircraft lifted off from the grass beyond the 08R threshold. The tire marks crossed the threshold and the clearway and ended about 240 meters past the threshold, on the grass. The tail and the wheels of both main landing gears struck the approach light. The TAIL_STRIKE parameter was recorded at 11:57:29.

V1 (169 kt) was reached already in the air, at 11 ft radio altitude. At 15 ft the pitch was 12.2° and the AoA 14°. Automatic stall protection activated (slats to the gapped position) and, at 76 ft, the gear was retracted once V2 was reached.

Return, fuel dump and landing

At 12:00:49 the crew declared PAN-PAN and requested vectors and a level in order to carry out a fuel dump. ATC cleared FL100, but the crew asked to level off at FL90. On reaching 9,000 ft, the commander designated by the operator (who had been in the left jumpseat for the takeoff) became the pilot in command. 62 tonnes of fuel were jettisoned between 12:22 and 13:07 UTC.

There were two low passes over runway 26R with the main gear extended for a visual inspection from the ground, each followed by a go-around (at 5,000 ft and 2,600 ft). The final landing, with flaps 30, took place at 13:56 UTC on 26R: mass 176.5 t and 143 kt IAS. Four tires on the left gear were damaged. The aircraft taxied to taxiway A6 and passengers disembarked via stairs. There was smoke on the left gear, but firefighters found no fire.

Left main landing gear after landing: destroyed tires. Photo circulated in the coverage of the event.

Four Vietnamese pilots were in the cockpit. The pilot in command for the takeoff, 64, had accumulated 27,182 hours (7,795 on the 787). The pilot monitoring had 12,375 hours. A third pilot, whom the operator had designated to fly the aircraft after takeoff, has 22,900 hours (7,356 on the 787) and was the one who carried out the low passes and the landing. The fourth pilot, holding a CPL and with 1,444 hours on the 787-9, had no active role.

How a 787 brakes

The Dreamliner uses electro-mechanical brakes. The command is electric end to end, and that changes how the report’s percentages have to be read.

The system has two blocks: the BCSM (Brake Control and Monitoring) groups the left and right BSCUs (each with an inboard and an outboard channel, four independent channels), plus data concentrators on each axle (wheel speed, anti-skid, pressure and temperature).

The EMBS (Electro-Mechanical Brake System) has four EBACs (one controller per BSCU channel) and 32 electric brake actuators (EBA): four per wheel, on the eight wheels of the main gear. Each EBA is a motor with a gearbox and screw that clamps the carbon pack. Four power supply units (EBPSU) each feed one channel.

The captain’s and first officer’s pedals are mechanically linked. The left pedal goes to the left BSCU; the right one, to the right BSCU. The BSCU command travels over a CAN bus to the EBAC; the EBAC moves the EBAs. There is no “pressure in psi”, since the percentage the BFU cites is a command of application.

During taxi, with wheel speed below about 45 kt, the system applies only half of the brakes on each gear and alternates pairs of axles (Taxi Brake Release) to wear down less carbon. With heavy application, rollout, RTO or parking, all brakes become active.

The RTO autobrake (maximum effort) only activates if the aircraft is on the ground, ground speed exceeds 85 kt and both thrust levers are at idle. On this takeoff the levers were at TO/GA (100–101 % N1), so the RTO does not explain the application. Nor does the brake pulse when the gear retracts, because the gear was retracted already in the air.

What 17–27 % at 168 knots means

It is not a rejected takeoff, because an RTO calls for maximum effort; here the pedal does not reach the stop (7.2° out of 12.5°, slightly less than 60 % of travel) and the BSCU command stays in the lower third. Nor is it the taxi logic, because at 168 kt that logic no longer applies.

It is enough to kill the acceleration of a 241-tonne 787-9. TOGA thrust pushes forward; 17–27 % of clamping across eight carbon packs pulls back. The kinematic result in the report is consistent with an IAS that does not rise (or dips for a moment), a rotation 12 kt below VR and a liftoff from the grass.

The asymmetry is persistent, revealing that there was more command on the left, and it matches the fact that, on landing, four tires on the left gear failed and there was smoke on that side. It does not by itself prove that the left brake “stuck”, because it could also be more weight on that gear, more left pedal or anti-skid trimming the right side.

Three families of hypotheses remain open. The BFU took the BSCUs and the Electric Brake Actuator Controllers precisely to tell them apart.

Pedal input from the pilot flying. The recorder sees left pedal movement. On the 787 the brake “pad” sits above the rudder one. A poorly placed foot, directional compensation with a raised heel or an unintentional rest at high speed produces a real command. 7.2° is not a stamp, but at 168 kt it does not need to be.
Uncommanded system command. A BSCU/EBAC channel failure, pedal sensor, residual autobrake or an EBA that did not return to running clearance. The four-channel architecture makes left/right and inboard/outboard independent; a rogue channel should not clamp all eight brakes, but a bias on one side does explain 27 % versus 17 %.
Combination. A light pedal plus logic that amplifies it, or anti-skid intervening unevenly once the wheel is already dragging.

With the information shared so far, it is impossible to know. What no longer fits is “only miscalculated performance” or “only weak engines”: the report itself says the pilot monitoring increased N1 and that there was a brake command in two phases of the takeoff roll.

A fine point when reading the appendix plots is that pedal and BSCU command are not the same thing. The BSCU blends pedal, anti-skid, locked wheel and structural limits. A 27 % command may be more (or less) than 58 % of pedal travel, depending on what the anti-skid is doing at that speed. The BFU has not yet published EBA current or clamping force. Without that, it is not known whether the 27 % translated into real clamping or whether an actuator stopped halfway through its stroke.

Damage and status of the investigation

The BFU describes substantial damage to the tail section from contact with the pavement and the lights, and to four tires on the left gear. Vietnamese media, citing the Civil Aviation Authority of Vietnam, had detailed longitudinal marks and tearing of the lower skin, and tires 1, 5 and 6 on the left plus number 3 on the right. The German report limits itself to “four tires on the left main landing gear”. The aircraft was left grounded in Munich.

The investigation remains open. The interim report does not yet analyse takeoff performance versus runway, the consistency between what the crew perceived (a speed plateau halfway down the runway and a further drop after V1, according to the CAAV) and what the EAFR measured (a plateau of about 168 kt and rotation at 163 kt), nor the exact role of the brakes. The BFU is investigating under Regulation (EU) 996/2010 and the German FIUUG law.

Germany confirms the Vietnam Airlines 787 that overran Munich's runway applied brakes during takeoff

Sydney air traffic controller had high fatigue risk when Virgin jet cut in front of Qantas, report says

Posted Mon at 2:11am

Monday at 2:11am

, updated Mon at 2:40am

Monday at 2:40am

An incident on August 17 at Sydney Airport is one of two incidents detailed in the latest report by the ATSB. (Supplied: ATSB)

In short:

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau releases two reports on two close call incidents at Sydney Airport as part of six ongoing investigations.

The reports say that during one incident on August 17, there was one traffic control operator in the tower, with a high predicted fatigue level.

The safety regulator says that in both cases flight and ground staff quickly identified the conflicts and "acted accordingly".

An air traffic controller with a high risk of fatigue was on duty when a Virgin Australia jet cut in front of a Qantas plane at Sydney Airport in August, safety investigators have revealed.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has released two preliminary reports into close-call incidents at the airport in August.

The reports did not make findings or recommendations, but outlined the sequence of events, and the conditions at the time.

The two reports are among six investigations underway into close call incidents at the airport.

The first incident happened on August 17, when Virgin flight VA1589 was taxiing to the domestic terminal after diverting from Newcastle because of bad weather.

About 9:40am, the air traffic controller told the Virgin crew to "follow the Qantas to vacate ahead, hold short runway 25".

The first incident involving Virgin flight VA1589 took place on August 17. (Supplied: ATSB)

According to the report, the Virgin captain read back only the hold-short instruction, and the controller did not recognise the incomplete read back and moved on to other tasks.

Shortly afterwards, the crew of Qantas flight QF420 saw the Virgin jet approaching a taxiway intersection at a speed that suggested it would not give way.

They were forced to stop the aircraft using normal braking.

The Virgin jet passed in front of the Qantas aircraft, and its crew did not realise there was a conflict until the Qantas crew queried it with the controller.

The controller was removed from duty for the rest of the day, and later told investigators their view of the taxiway intersection from the tower was limited by equipment in the tower cab.

The taxiing incident involving Qantas flight QF420 and Virgin flight VA1589. (Supplied: ATSB)

Fatigue concerns

The air traffic controller, according to the report, was rostered to finish at 8:50pm the night before the August 17 incident, and start again at 5:30am the next day.

Sydney runway conflict 'severe'

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau delivers findings on four of six ongoing investigations at Sydney Airport.

They were the only controller in the tower, with a high predicted fatigue level.

The report said predicted fatigue did not mean a controller was necessarily fatigued, only that they were at risk based on their roster.

The controller described their mental fatigue level at the time as "fine and alert", and that they were "fit for duty".

The report also noted that Airservices Australia, which provides air traffic control at Sydney, does not have a fatigue management system approved by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.

In a statement, Airservices Australia said it acknowledged the interim reports and would "review the findings once these investigations are complete".

Pushback conflict

The second incident happened on August 25, when a controller cleared a Jetstar A320 operating as JST745, to push back from bay 59 onto a taxiway.

About 30 seconds later, the same controller cleared a QantasLink Dash 8, with the call sign QLK427D, to taxi along the same taxiway, past the A320's bay.

The Dash 8 crew saw the A320's tail moving backwards and stopped about 100 metres from the bay.

The A320's pushback driver and dispatcher also stopped the pushback and warned the flight crew.

Flights QLK427D and JST745 at their closest point. (Supplied: ATSB)

The Jetstar jet was then towed back onto its bay so the Dash 8 could pass behind it.

Three air traffic controllers told the ATSB that push backs from some gates were prone to conflicts, because aircraft push straight onto an active taxiway rather than an "apron".

The tower shift manager and a supervising instructor also said the area could be a "black spot" where aircraft were not always detected.

The shift manager was returning to Sydney after time at another airport, and was working under supervision while their endorsements were reinstated.

Three trainees were also on shift.

The controller on duty said they "felt fine", but had "not had many days off in the past month".

Aircraft taxiing routes. (Supplied: ATSB)

ATSB says crews acted in incidents

ATSB chief commissioner Angus Mitchell said both incidents were mitigated because flight crews and ground staff identified the conflicts and acted accordingly.

"As such, an important safety defence acted appropriately, but our role is to establish why crew actions were necessary to prevent a more serious outcome," he said.

Mr Mitchell said investigators were yet to determine whether staffing contributed to any of the six incidents they are examining or whether it was an underlying condition being effectively managed by Airservices.

Sydney air traffic controller had high fatigue risk when Virgin jet cut in front of Qantas, report says

A rare airline incident exposed a safety system most passengers never see

Published: Oct. 01, 2026, 5:00 a.m.

Airline crews regularly train for emergency situations, including security threats and communication breakdowns, to help keep passengers safe during flights. (AP Photo/Ohad Zwigenberg)AP Photo/Ohad Zwigenberg

By Chris Pugh, cleveland.com

An unusual airline incident recently drew worldwide attention after an Israel-bound flight sent emergency alerts and landed in Saudi Arabia following a cockpit-related dispute.

While such events are rare, aviation experts say airlines spend years training pilots and cabin crews to respond when something unexpected happens in the air.

Modern airline crews receive extensive safety and security training before they ever carry passengers. Pilots learn how to communicate during emergencies, follow strict procedures and work together when problems arise. Airlines also use a system known as crew resource management, which teaches pilots and flight attendants how to share information, ask questions and reduce mistakes during stressful situations.

Security threats are another major focus. Flight crews practice handling disruptive passengers, medical emergencies and situations that could affect the safety of the aircraft. Federal regulators require airlines to conduct regular training so crews know how to react quickly while keeping passengers calm. Experts say preparation is critical because emergencies often develop without warning.

Aviation specialists stress that cockpit disputes are uncommon, but they highlight why communication and professionalism are so important.

When concerns arise, crews follow established procedures designed to protect passengers and maintain control of the flight. Experts say the aviation industry’s safety record is built on training, communication and constant review of unusual incidents to prevent future problems.

A rare airline incident exposed a safety system most passengers never see

Operational safety and unmanned aircraft: Hazards related to air traffic control activity

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 October 2025

A.M. Almeida

F.P. Da Silva

L.F. Rodrigues Pinto

Abstract

The increase in activities related to unmanned aircraft systems and the implementation of this new ecosystem have introduced new hazards, impacting the operational safety of air traffic, particularly near airports, creating risks and disruptions in the flow of aircraft.

The establishment of airspace for unmanned traffic management has required the integration of this new airspace with the existing one, bringing the potential for issues from this integration.

A method was identified as needed to guide the detection of hazards posed to air traffic control activities and the consequent implementation of required mitigation measures.

The aim of this work is to propose a framework for identifying hazards introduced to air traffic control, with a view to ensure the safe transition of this process.

The method involved consulting air traffic operational safety specialists via a questionnaire, presenting the hazards highlighted in the literature concerning the integration of new airspace concepts within air traffic control activities.

The results, obtained through a Delphi consultation, were analysed based on the most frequently assigned scores (mode) to reflect expert consensus. The results were organised into the proposed framework, establishing a guide to risk management activities aimed at implementing the change.

The resulting structure was re-submitted to specialists and validated based on the Delphi method. Contributions to society include a guide for this process and potential future implementations, while the literature gap was addressed by adding knowledge to the scientific process.